INTRODUCTION
THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER is to integrate in a synthetic presentation various equilibrium concepts involving preplay or intraplay communication between the players. We will distinguish several classes of such noncooperative solution concepts associated with communication, by relating their use to the interpretation of the rules of the game. Three successive extensions of the Nash equilibrium will be considered: the "(normal form) correlated equilibrium", the "extensive form correlated equilibrium" and the "communication equilibrium." The first notion is due to Aumann (1974) ; the other two were first introduced for repeated games with incomplete information (in Forges (1984) and Forges (1982) respectively). Myerson (1986) also studied multistage games with communication and proposed a sequential rationality criterion in this context.
The correlated equilibrium appears as an appropriate solution concept as soon as preplay communication is taken seriously. In this case, one cannot forbid the players to use a "correlation device" selecting a vector of signals, one for every player, before the beginning of the game. So one is led to the (Nash) equilibria of the extended game including the preliminary lottery, which is a way of defining correlated equilibria. (See Aumann (1985) for a stronger foundation for this solution concept.)
Since in this first approach signals are only sent in the preplay phase, the corresponding solution concept depends only on the normal form of the game; it can thus be referred to as "normal form correlated equilibrium." If, however, the situation to be analyzed has some duration (like a multistage game), one is tempted to extend the game by adding a lottery at every stage (not only at the beginning), each player receiving a signal about its outcome. Or, in a more descriptive vein, it seems natural that in a multistage game the players' knowledge of the state of the world can increase over time. One is led to allow each player to observe privately extraneous signals, such as "sunspots",2 at every stage of the game. A notion generalizing the correlation device can be introduced: the autonomous device, which selects a vector of signals, one for each player, at every stage of the game (we will assume that such a device recalls its past outputs, so that the signals of different stages may be correlated). A (Nash) equilibrium of the game extended by means of an autonomous device will be called an "extensive form correlated equilibrium." Now, if the problem is to enable the players to coordinate their strategies at every stage of the game, why not go one step further and add to the game a general "communication device", selecting outputs for the players at every stage but also receiving inputs from them? Such machines could be programmed so that the signals that are sent depend on all the past inputs and outputs; this involves both preplay and intraplay communication. In the same way as above, a solution concept can be associated; it will be referred to as "communication equilibrium."
The use of communication devices acting at every stage of the game (including autonomous devices), though attractive, is hard to justify if the rules of the game are interpreted in a strict sense. In this case, there are no other intraplay communication possibilities than those consigned in the tree, so that the game is played following a scenario of the form: before the beginning of the game, the players eventually meet and communicate; next, they go into separate cubicles where all their information comes from a central machine that controls the game. If such a strict point of view is adopted, the only communication that seems legitimate is preplay communication, corresponding to the normal form correlated equilibria. (Autonomous devices and their associated extensive form correlated equilibria can be justified with an intermediate interpretation of the game tree: in the previous scenario, the cubicles would have (differently oriented) windows through which the players could observe the course of the clouds ... or sunspots.)
Another point of view can be adopted: the specified rules of the game can be interpreted as providing a "reduced form" framework within which the players must interact, yet which does not preclude them from engaging in various forms of communication. While the analysis of the tree containing all the communication moves could be very complex, the solution concepts considered here enable a manageable description. The different classes of equilibria correspond to various restrictions on the communication possibilities. Obviously, many other variants are conceivable: one could focus on memoryless communication devices (modelling telephone networks), or on "direct communication," where the players 2 The idea of referring to extrinsic signals as "sunspots" is taken from Cass and Shell (1983) . The possibility of a connection between sunspot equilibria and (extensive form) correlated equilibria was pointed out to me by J.-F. Mertens. Notice that sunspot equilibria were developed in a context completely different than the present one and from here the players may have private observations on the sunspots. are restricted to public announcements, heard exactly as they are made (see Farrell (1984) ), and so on.
In the next sections, we formalize the solution concepts and show, for each of them, that the set of corresponding equilibrium payoffs has a canonical representation (in the spirit of the revelation principle) and is a convex polyhedron. We also provide for each concept a "super-canonical" game such that the set of payoffs associated with the solution concept is precisely the set of standard Nash equilibrium payoffs of this game.
BASIC DEFINITIONS
We concentrate on a multistage game G with perfect recall, played by N players (indexed by n = 1, 2,. .., N) during T periods (indexed by t = 1, 2,. . ., T). Period t of G begins with a move of nature; then every player n gets additional information, which concerns the past moves, including those of nature; finally, the players move simultaneously to conclude period t. Let S, be the (finite) set of possible additional information of player n at period t; the set of information of player n at period t is thus Ht _fIt= S7; let M' be the (finite) set of possible moves for player n at period t. We use It to denote the set of all the pure behaviors available to player n at time t, i.e. the set of all mappings from H, to MW. The description of the game is completed by real payoff functions defined on the space of all histories (i.e., sequences of moves of all players, including nature). This is very close to von Neumann's definition of an extensive form; we discuss extensions to the more general extensive form of Kuhn in the concluding remarks.
To refer to events occurring before the beginning of the game G, it will be convenient (but in fact not necessary (see Proposition 1)) to add a preliminary stage (denoted "stage 0") to the description above. At stage 0, no information is given and no move is made; we take thus the convention that S' and M' are singletons for every n= 1,... ,N. 
A communication device is called autonomous if it does not involve any set of inputs (that is, I" is a singleton set, for every n and t).
A correlation device is an autonomous device where all outputs precede the beginning of the game: it is completely described by sets On of outputs for every player n(n = 1, . . . ,N) together with a probability distribution P on 1In o" (i.e., 0n _ oOn; 0o, t 1, and In, t O, are singleton sets). period t of Gd can be described as follows: All players n = 1,... ,N get simultaneously their new information in S,. They transmit simultaneously an input in 1, to the device d, which then selects a vector of outputs in Hln O7, one for every player n = 1,..., N, using P,. The players n = 1,... ,N make their move in M,.
Given a communication device d, one can define the extension
REMARK 1: For the sake of simplicity and brevity, the sets 1, and O will be assumed to be finite. Using the results of Aumann (1964), the same analysis could be done for probability spaces (which could be required in a Bayesian approach). In particular, Proposition 1 holds in the general context, which justifies a posteriori the finiteness assumption. (Further details can be found in Forges (1985b).) REMARK 2: If d is an autonomous device, the outputs of stage 0 (before the players get their information in S') can as well be sent at stage 1 (after they get their information in S.') because the players cannot make any input in between. But it may be easier to think in terms of the events "preceding the beginning of the game."
Now we turn to the associated solution concepts. DEFINITION 2: A communication equilibrium (resp., extensive form correlated equilibrium; resp., normal form correlated equilibrium) in G is a Nash equilibrium in the extended game Gd obtained by adding a communication (resp., autonomous; resp., correlation) device d to the game G.
A set of equilibrium payoffs can be associated with every class of devices; we denote by D (resp., Do; resp., C) the set of payoffs from communication equilibria (resp., extensive form correlated equilibria; resp., (normal form) correlated equilibria). Obviously, C is a subset of Do which is itself included in D; these inclusions may be strict as the following examples show. 
A CANONICAL REPRESENTATION
We will now establish that every set of equilibrium payoffs has a canonical representation. This shows in particular that the "descriptive approach" to autonomous devices (where the players can observe extraneous signals from their outside environment) is fully equivalent to the "normative approach" (where devices are used for strategic coordination, i.e., recommendations are given to the players). In the case of normal form correlated equilibria, the canonical representation was obtained by Aumann (1974 Aumann ( , 1985 . Various other particular cases are known under the name "revelation principle" (see, for instance, Myerson, 1982) . To get a precise statement, we need some terminology. Proposition 1 provides several corollaries. The first one3 states that to realize an equilibrium payoff in Do, the players do not need to observe private signals at every stage of the game: provided that they receive a private signal before the beginning of the game, one can restrict to public lotteries at the next stages. This strengthens the analogy with sunspot equilibria, sunspots being usually thought of as publicly observable. 
THE STRUCTURE OF D, D0, AND C, AND A SUPER-CANONICAL

REPRESENTATION
We will now show that, from a computational point of view, the concepts introduced here are more tractable than the Nash equilibrium. The sets of equilibrium payoffs considered here have indeed a very simple structure. For C, this property was established by Aumann (1974, 1985) . Every canonical communication device for G can be described by a mixed strategy P of player N+ 1. Indeed, 'N+1 is the typical mapping that would be used by a deterministic canonical device at stage t and even if Definition 1 was rather in terms of behavioral strategies, Kuhn's theorem (see Kuhn, 1953 ) is applicable (since the devices have perfect recall). Let o0 = (on) be the N-tuple of pure strategies of players 1, . . . ,N consisting of reporting the truth and playing the suggested move at every stage. The set of canonical communication equilibria in G can be represented as the set of all mixed strategies P of player N+1 such that (ao, P) is an equilibrium in the N+1 person game. This set is a convex polyhedron since it is described by finitely many linear inequalities (expressing that for every n, o" is preferable to any other pure strategy). The same property holds for the set of associated payoffs, this being the image of the polyhedron by a linear mapping, and hence for D.
Q.E.D.
This characterization enables us to construct, for each given game G, a single communication (resp., autonomous; resp., correlation) device d such that D (resp., Do; resp., C) is precisely the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of Gd. To see why such a "super-canonical form" may be useful, observe that each canonical device constructed in Proposition 1 is designed with a particular communication (resp., autonomous; resp., correlation) equilibrium in mind. Suppose that the players have to negotiate over and agree upon the design of the communication (resp., autonomous; resp., correlation) device. Then one might worry that these negotiations would lead to a leaking of private information (see Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) for a discussion of this problem). With the super-canonical form we will construct, the players do not have to bargain about the device to be used: one single extension of the underlying game G serves for all equilibrium payoffs in D (resp., Do; resp., C).
To The latter construction cannot be used for D because then outputs are selected as a function of inputs from the players and a vector of outputs associated with different canonical devices dl,...,dk can reveal much more information than a single output from one of the di's (think of the nonrevealing equilibrium and the completely revealing equilibrium in Example 1).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
REMARK 1: We have seen that in general D is strictly larger than Do and Do is strictly larger than C. There are however classes of games where C = D. This has some importance since the computations needed for C are conceptually less difficult. Also, if C = D, one can get the effect of a general communication device without violating the rules of the game. Such an equivalence result was first established for a class of repeated games with incomplete information (Forges, 1982 (Forges, , 1985a . Similar arguments can be applied to show that C = D in (one-shot) games of information transmission, a model studied for instance by Green and Stokey (1980) and Crawford and Sobel (1982) , where one player has private information and sends a signal to a second player who then takes an action.4 (See also Forges, 1985b.) 4This result requires the use of costless signals; therefore, it does not directly pertain to signalling games where signals are costly. (1953) ). To extend the analysis to arbitrary extensive games, one is tempted to allow the output of the devices at any node to depend on the information set containing that node (the devices would be "attached" to the information sets as before to the stages; this amounts to working with the agent normal form of the game, which is obtained by giving the running of every information set to a different agent). But even for games with the simple temporal structure used here, this extension raises grave questions. To see this, let us consider an example. At the beginning of the game, nature chooses one of two payoff matrices, T or B, with probability 1/2 and informs player 1 of its choice. Player 1 then sends a message to his uninformed opponent, who has to take one of two possible actions, L or R. Here, we want signalling to model the idea that player 1 can "talk" to player 2: we allow thus a large set M of messages, say M = [0, 1] to simplify the analysis (we will come back to this later on), and we assume that signalling is costless. The payoffs are as shown in Figure 3 .It is easily checked that D = {(0, 1)}, every communication equilibrium being necessarily nonrevealing: independently of his type, player 1 wants to induce action L with the highest probability; hence player 2 can just maximize his expected payoff, leading him to play R (this holds for every set M). Now, let us describe an autonomous device attached to the information sets and analyze its effects. As before, the device is not connected with the game, in the sense that it does not have access to the information of the players; in particular, it does not know whether T or B has been chosen by nature. Being autonomous, the device can only send outputs, it cannot get any information from the players. But the device consists of "connected branches," each branch acting at an information set, so that it can send a different output to player 1 at the information set "T" and at the information set "B." Let us show that this enables achievement of a completely revealing equilibrium, where player 2 plays L if T and R if B. For this, let the autonomous device select a message ,u uniformly in M and transmit it as an output to player 1 at his information set T and to player 2 at any information set. No output is sent to player 1 at the information set B. The equilibrium strategies are: for player 1, at T, send the message ,u received from the device; at B, send an arbitrary message in M; for player 2, play L on ,u, R on all the other messages. The associated payoff is (0.5, 1.5). Here, one uses that ,u is chosen uniformly in [0, 1], so that player 1 at B cannot "guess" , (the probability that a message m coincides with ,u is zero). But the same analysis can be done with a large finite set M, in which case the equilibrium payoff has the form (0.5 + E/2, 1.5 -E).
Notice that this scenario is equivalent to the one corresponding to the "agent normal form" of the game where nature chooses between two individuals 1 T and 1 B at the beginning. The autonomous device would not know whether player 1 T or 1B has been selected to play the game but could transmit different outputs to each of them, to be used by the agent if he is active.
This example illustrates that generalized devices are too powerful. If one applies to a multistage game the generalization of the autonomous device designed to deal with arbitrary extensive games, one can get a set of equilibrium payoffs not only larger than Do but larger than D. What is then the appropriate device for general extensive games? This question is left for future research. 
